A feminist analysis of child neglect cases from the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice = Uma análise feminista do abandono afetivo no Superior Tribunal de Justiça by Püschel, Flavia Portella
REVISTA DIREITO GV  |  SÃO PAULO  |  V. 16 N. 1  |  e1944 |  2020ESCOLA DE DIREITO DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS
A feminist analysis of child neglect
cases from the Brazilian Superior
Court of Justice
UMA ANÁLISE FEMINISTA DO ABANDONO AFETIVO NO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA
Flavia Portella Püschel1
Abstract
This article analyzes the opinions of judges of the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice
(STJ) in child neglect cases from a feminist perspective by “asking the woman ques-
tion” to identify implicit male bias in legal concepts and standards that are appar-
ently gender neutral. Several sexist arguments can be found both in opinions against
awarding damages for child neglect and in opinions in favor of it. Sexist bias is shown
in the disregard of legal doctrine, as well as of the ambivalent character of family
relations and their hierarchical structure. This bias is further expressed in the deval-
uation of women’s interests and life experiences, stereotyping, problems of logical
reasoning as well as in the disregard of statutory rules. The article concludes that the
STJ was unable to take into account the point of view of women and the circumstances
in which child neglect actually takes place in Brazilian society today. The court devel-
oped a concept of harm that, although apparently gender neutral, is based on dis-
criminatory reasons and has greater negative impact on women than on men.  
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Resumo
Neste artigo, as posições defendidas pelos ministros do Superior Tribunal de Justiça
(STJ) acerca da responsabilidade civil por abandono afetivo são analisadas de uma
perspectiva feminista, com emprego de método pelo qual se tornam explícitos vieses
machistas implícitos em conceitos e standards jurídicos aparentemente neutros.
Encontram-se nas decisões analisadas diversos argumentos discriminatórios, tanto
em votos desfavoráveis quanto em votos favoráveis à reparação por abandono afe-
tivo. Os vieses machistas se mostram pela desconsideração da tradição jurídico-
dogmática e da doutrina especializada, bem como pela desconsideração do caráter
ambivalente das relações familiares e suas estruturas hierárquicas, passando pela
desvalorização expressa de interesses e experiências de vida femininas, pelo uso de
estereótipos femininos negativos e por problemas de lógica argumentativa e inter-
pretação sistemática do Direito, chegando até a desconsideração de norma legal
expressa. Conclui-se que o STJ não foi capaz de levar em conta o ponto de vista femi-
nino e as circunstâncias concretas em que o abandono afetivo acontece hoje no Bra-
sil, tendo desenvolvido o conceito jurídico de dano indenizável em um sentido que,
apesar de aparentemente neutro, é fundado em razões discriminatórias e atinge as
mulheres de modo desproporcionalmente negativo em comparação com os homens.
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INTRODUCTION*
In 2005 the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ) ruled its first case of tort liability for non-
pecuniary damages arising from child neglect (BRAZIL, 2005). Child neglect in this context
means the absence of the parent and the lack of psychological and moral support on the par-
ent’s part during the child’s development. Liability for non-pecuniary damages for child neg-
lect is distinguished from liability for lack of material support and can, therefore, be attributed
even to parents who have regularly contributed financially to the support of their offspring.
This is a subject that has aroused great controversy in Brazil, both among legal scholars1
and in the courts. In the STJ itself, as of 2005, different positions were formed, which cul-
minated in a trial to uniformize the positions of the court’s Panels on the issue in 2014.
In this article, we will analyze the different positions defended by the STJ justices, from
a feminist perspective of law, that is, by applying a method of analysis of law that reflects:
the status of women as “outsiders,” who need ways of challenging and undermining
dominant legal conventions and of developing alternative conventions that take better
account of women’s experiences and needs. (BARTLETT, 1990, p. 831) 
The purpose of feminist theories of law, such as the one we use here, is to contribute to
harness the power of law in building gender equality rather than to perpetuate patriarchal
patterns of subordination (CHAMALLAS, 2003, p. 22).2
Among the different methods employed in feminist legal research, this work applies
one associated with the line of investigation – still little explored in the reflections on private
law in Brazil – that seeks to make explicit the male biases implicit in apparently neutral con-
cepts and standards3 (CHAMALLAS, 2003, p. 6).
In this context, bias indicates not only practices intentionally aimed at harming women,
but also those whose impacts or negative effects on women are unintended (CHAMALLAS,
2003, p. 7).
* Traslator: Elizabeth Ann Miller.
1 The academic debate is not the object of this work, so we will not deal with the positions found in the literature.
For an overview of the discussions, see, among others: Hironaka (2006, p. 131-149), Madaleno (2006, p. 151-
169), Moraes (2006, p. 171-201), Pereira (2015, p. 399-410), and Schreiber (2015, p. 32-49).
2 In this sense, a work of critical analysis, such as feminist analysis of law, participates in the broader project
of “reflecting on the effects of doctrine and court rulings on the distribution of power and social resources” (empha-
sis in original, our translation), identifying room for arbitrariness and proposing institutional reforms
(RODRIGUEZ, 2012a, p. 12-13).
3 This is the method often referred to by the expression “asking the woman question” in English language
literature (CHAMALLAS, 2003, p. 7; BARTLETT, 1990, p. 837-849).
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Such unintentional practices include discriminatory treatment due to insensitivity, lack
of empathy, use of stereotypes or hostility to women. Practices that have a disproportionate
negative effect on women as a group without legitimate justification are also included. Final-
ly, the notion of bias also includes the devaluation of interests, activities, harm, etc., socially
associated with women (CHAMALLAS; WRIGGINS, 2010, p. 24).
As one can see, in this analysis we are not aligned with any specific school of feminist think-
ing. We follow Martha Chamallas’ proposal to adopt, from various feminist perspectives, a series
of criteria for identifying situations of gender-based injustice (CHAMALLAS, 2013, p. 27).
Among these criteria are unjustified differential treatment, the contribution to an increase
or maintenance of power differences between men and women in society, and the devalu-
ation of activities socially associated with women (CHAMALLAS, 2013, p. 28-29).
Therefore, to identify implicit male biases one cannot limit the analysis to only formal equal-
ity. It is necessary to examine the real effects that law has on women as a group (CHAMALLAS,
2003, p. 6).
In this process, it must be borne in mind that even uncontroversial legal concepts can be
detrimental to women, since the structuring of legal institutes reflects the viewpoint of those
in power and thus tends to be invisible (CHAMALLAS, 2003, p. 7-8).
This is explained to the extent that law presupposes an idea of  a gender neutral person, but
in a context in which norms are in fact created by men, from the male point of view, based on
the experiences of men’s lives, without regard, therefore, to women’s experiences from the
point of view of women themselves (MacKINNON, 1989, p. 88). As Catharine MacKinnon
(1989, p. 88) states, gender is invisible in law because it is not a relevant factor in distinguishing
between men. As stated by Martha Chamallas (2003, p. 7-8):
Male-centered standards derive their force from being uncritically accepted as universal
in nature. Challenging them is particularly difficult once they have gained legitimacy as
an “objective” way of categorizing people and organizing people’s activities and work.
We consider that the feminist analysis of law can be seen as manifesting a critical under-
standing of legal rationality, according to which “the role of [legal] doctrine in justifying court
decisions under the Rule of Law [...], namely, its function is to translate into law the political
principle of equality before the law [...]” (RODRIGUEZ, 2012a, p. 9, our translation).
In this sense, legal doctrine is an instrument not only of decision (and guarantee of legal
certainty), but of the legitimation of decisions, which operates through a continuous process of
systematization and re-systematization of law, based on the previous tradition, to account for
new social conflicts (RODRIGUEZ, 2012b, p. 22-24).
Such a doctrinal process of development consists primarily of a social dispute practice to
determine the meaning of legal norms, which takes place both within and outside the juris-
dictional institutions through specialized doctrinal debate and the public sphere in general
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(RODRIGUEZ, 2012a, pp. 10-11).4
Given this, it is clear that any gender bias enters tort law – and other legal institutions
– through the very process of its conceptual development (CHAMALLAS, 2013, p. 205).
We will test this hypothesis in the case of the development of liability for child neglect in
the STJ. This is an interesting case for three reasons. The first of these is that there is clearly
a gender division when it comes to parents who abandon their children: in the vast majority
of cases, the father leaves the child in the mother’s care. Data released by the Gender and Race
Inequality Portrait (IPEA, n.d.) based on IBGE’s National Household Survey (PNAD) showed
a large difference between the number of households with single mothers and single fathers.
In 2015, families composed of women with children represented 16.3% of the total Brazilian
families, while families composed of men and children represented only 2.2%. Although it is
not possible to state from this data that the reason for the father’s absence is always abandon-
ment (and not widowhood, for example), it can be concluded that whatever the reason for
the father’s absence it is more common for women than men to be taking care of their chil-
dren without the presence of the other parent. Another indication of the size of paternal aban-
donment in Brazil is the number of children without their father’s name on their birth regis-
tration. Based on the 2011 school census conducted by National Institute for Educational
Studies and Research “Anísio Teixeira” (INEP), the National Council of Justice (CNJ) estimat-
ed that there are more than 5 million students in this situation (CNJ, 2015, p. 10).
The second reason is that there is no express statutory norm about liability for child neg-
lect, so the rules for its recognition as indemnifiable harm were created judicially, that is, al-
ready through doctrinal debate. This gives us a privileged perspective on how cognitive biases
determine the development of legal concepts (in this case, the concept of indemnifiable harm).
Finally, rules of tort law are apparently neutral, that is, they do not expressly take into account
the gender of any of the parties involved, a case in which male biases tend to become invisible.
In cases of child neglect, the invisibility of gender discrimination also occurs because
actions in tort involve fathers and their daughters or sons, so that often both plaintiff and
defendant are men. In order to see the gender issue involved in the conflict, it must be borne
in mind that the relationship between plaintiff and defendant in this type of law suit arises in
the context of family relations5 in which the woman-mother also participates.6
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4 Advancing to a more abstract level of analysis, this view of legal doctrine relates to the argumentative
character of law, as advocated by Ronald Dworkin (1986) and Neil MacCormick (2005).
5 These are families formed from heteroaffective couples. The precedents of the STJ do not include cases of
child neglect in families formed from homosexual couples, and we have no data on the occurrence of child
neglect according to the sexual orientation of parents.
6 The focus on the family is relatively recent in the history of feminist legal theory, having gained relevance
only since the 1990s, with the third generation of feminist legal theory (CHAMALLAS, 2013, p. 364).
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The hetero-affective family in Brazil is still strongly marked by gender-based roles, and
women are primarily responsible for caring for children, the elderly and the sick, as well as
performing housework. In addition, the percentage of women who perform paid work is still
lower than men, with a pay gap in favor of men. Finally, it should not be forgotten that most
families where women raise children alone live below the poverty line.7
In her recent work on changes in Brazilian families, which analyzes the period from 1976
to 2012, Nathalie Reis Itaboraí points out that data reveals “a tendency for continuous change,
which occurs in all [social] classes, towards a better relative position for women in relation
to their partners” (ITABORAÍ, 2017, p. 214, our translation). Still, the asymmetry of power
between men and women persists. According to the same author, certain dimensions of gen-
der stratification, especially cultural expectations about the feminine character of domestic
and care duties, are very resistant to change and act as a limit to the processes of female eman-
cipation (ITABORAÍ, 2017, p. 342).8
It is evident, therefore, that the burden of domestic work and childcare has a major impact
on women’s economic situation and, consequently, on their possibilities of achieving the
constitutionally prescribed gender equality. The situation is especially serious in the case of
women who take care of their children alone, as is the case of families involved in tort liability
actions for child neglect.
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Martha Albertson Feinman points out that feminists themselves devalued the family as an object of study
(FEINMAN, 1993, p. 403, n. 33).
7 According to IBGE’s 2017 National Continuous Household Survey 2017 (PNAD Contínua), in that year the
number of weekly hours that women devoted to housework was approximately twice that of men (RENAUX,
2018a). Regarding the pay gap, according to PNAD Contínua data for the fourth quarter of 2018, women
earn on average 20.5% less than men. In addition to earning less per hour worked, women work fewer
hours, which is related to the time they spend on household chores and caring for people (PARADELLA,
2019). According to the IBGE Social Indicators Synthesis, released in 2018, 56.9% of the residents of
households with single women with children under 14 live below the poverty line, with an income of up
to R$ 406 monthly. In comparison, residents of households with couples with children who live below the
poverty line are 30.4% (RENAUX, 2018b).
8 Obstacles are especially severe for lower-income women, who, in addition to having fewer job opportuni-
ties, tend to have a higher domestic workload and fewer alternatives to outsource domestic tasks (ITABO-
RAÍ, 2017, p. 342). In addition to social class, data from the IBGE Social Indicators Summary, released in 2018,
indicate that race is also an important component in defining the impact of domestic and care responsi-
bilities. Thus, 64.4% of residents in households with single women and children under 14 live below the
poverty line when the woman is black or brown. In comparison, the percentage of people living below
the poverty line in households where white single women with children under 14 live is 41.5%. As stat-
ed above, the overall percentage of people living below the poverty line in households with single women
with children under 14 years of age is 56.9% and 30.4% in households with couples and children under
14 (RENAUX, 2018b). 
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The relevant relationship for our analysis is not, therefore, simply that between the defen-
dant, man-father, and his daughter or son, but above all, the relationship between man-father
and woman-mother, constructed from family relationships, which has influence on the deci-
sion of the justices, regardless of whether the woman-mother enters the judicial process.
We will begin the analysis by describing the cases and court decisions, from the first time
the matter arose, to the unified ruling of the STJ. Next, we will analyze the different positions
defended by the Justices, considering their male bias, followed by the conclusions about the
hypothesis raised.
Before that, however, some clarification needs to be made. Feminist legal theory has
been criticized for defending norms that favor women simply because they favor women
(SCHWARTZ, 2001, p. 201). This is not the purpose of this text, regardless of whether this
criticism is appropriate or not. What interests us are the rules that treat women unfavorably
without adequate justification, thus contradicting the constitutional principle of equality
between women and men (FEDERAL CONSTITUTION [FC], art. 5, I) and the prohibition
of discrimination (FC, art. 3, IV).
Secondly, it must be made clear from the outset that this paper makes no quantitative
statement on the prevalence of gender bias in court rulings or in private law in general.9 Our
objective is to demonstrate that the discrimination of women through the biased development
of doctrinal concepts is an observable reality in Brazilian law.
1. THE DECISIONS OFTHE STJ
The first case of tort liability for child neglect tried by the STJ was REsp n. 75741110 (BRAZIL,
2005). This is a tort liability action brought by a son against his father, claiming compen-
sation for non-pecuniary damages because, since the divorce of the parents and the birth of
the father’s daughter by his second wife, the father avoided contact with the son, thus failing
to provide him with psychological and moral assistance, even though the father fulfilled his
obligation to provide child support. The son claims not to have had the opportunity to meet
and live with his half-sister, to have been ignored in his attempts at rapprochement and to
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9 It must be said, however, that since law is created by men, from the male point of view based on male expe-
riences, without taking into account female experiences from the female point of view (MacKINNON,
1989, p. 88), the tendency is that the presence of gender bias is not punctual, but pervasive and systemic.
10 The REsp (Recurso Especial) is an appeal that may be presented to the STJ to fight a decision of a second
instance tribunal that contradicts federal statutes or interprets such statutes in a different way than other
second instance tribunals. It is a special appeal designed to guarantee the application of federal statutes and
to uniformize their interpretation by state and federal tribunals (FC, art. 105, III).
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not have been able to count on his father’s presence at important moments in his life, which
caused him extreme suffering and humiliation (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 2).
The father, in turn, claims that the tort lawsuit is a retaliation on the part of his ex-wife,
mother of the plaintiff, due to the fact that he asked for a reduction of child support payments.
In addition, he claims that it was the ex-wife’s attitude – insulting phone calls and instruc-
tions for her son to assault his half-sister – that caused the father’s removal because “[these
actions] made the domestic situation during the biweekly visitation unbearable” (BRAZIL,
2005, p. 2, our translation).
In addition, the father claims to have traveled a lot, both in Brazil and abroad, which also
compromised the regularity of his meetings with his son, and claims to offer encouragement
to his son via telephone contact (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 2-3).
The action was dismissed as groundless by the first-instance judge. An appeal was filed
with the Minas Gerais State High Court which upheld the appeal and ordered the father to
pay non-pecuniary damages amounting to R$ 44,000. Given this, the father filed a Special
Appeal with the STJ (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 3-4).
The 4th Panel of the STJ upheld the appeal, by a majority vote, denying damages, on
November 29, 2005. Justice Barros Monteiro dissented (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 1).
The 4th Panel of the STJ judged another case of tort liability for child neglect in 2009.
This was REsp n. 514350 (BRAZIL, 2009a). Between the first and second trials, there was
a major change in the composition of the 4th Panel. Three justices had been replaced. Only
Justice Aldir Passarinho Jr. participated in both trials and was rapporteur of the 2009 judg-
ment. Despite the change in its composition, the 4th Panel retained its previous understand-
ing,11 this time unanimously, on the same grounds as the 2005 decision (BRAZIL, 2009a,
p. 10).
In 2012, there was the first ruling on the matter by the 3rd Panel of STJ, in the REsp
n. 1159242 (BRAZIL, 2012). The case was a tort liability action brought by a daughter against
her father seeking compensation for material and non-pecuniary damages resulting from
both material and moral neglect during her childhood and youth. The action was dismissed
as groundless by the first-instance judge. The daughter filed an appeal, which was upheld by
the São Paulo Court of Justice, and the amount of R$ 415,000 was established as compen-
sation for non-pecuniary damages. The father then filed a Special Appeal with the STJ, alleg-
ing that he did not neglect his daughter and that, even if he had, this fact did not constitute
a tort, and the only possible legal sanction was the loss of parental authority. He also referred
to the previous ruling by the 4th Panel, regarding the impossibility of compensation for child
neglect (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 3-4).
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11 Only the rapporteur, Justice Aldir Passarinho Jr., wrote an opinion which was validated by the others.
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The 3rd Panel decided, by majority, to grant the appeal in part, recognizing the right to
damages for child neglect, but reducing the value of the compensation to R$ 200,000. Justice
Massami Uyeda, who granted the father’s appeal, was defeated (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 14; 49).
Given the only partial provision of his Special Appeal, the father filed an Embargo de Divergên-
cia (which is an appeal to the STJ to uniformize its position regarding a question of law when
there are conflicting rulings among its panels), based on the difference of understanding on the
possibility of recovery for child neglect in the 3rd and 4th Panels of STJ (BRAZIL, 2014, p. 4).
In 2014, the Second Chamber of the STJ decided, by a majority vote, to dismiss the
Embargos de Divergência without judging the merits of the case (BRAZIL, 2014, p. 8-40). The
understanding that the ruling by the 3rd Panel represented only an exception to the rule of
irreparability defined by the 4th Panel, so that there was not really any disagreement between
the panels, prevailed.
In short, the result of the discussions in the STJ was the establishment of the irreparability
of moral damages for child neglect as a rule with the possibility of reparation as an exception.12
2. MALE BIAS INTHE ARGUMENT
Several of the arguments presented in the decisions of the first four cases of tort liability
for child neglect in the STJ have a sexist bias, even in votes in favor of redress for this type
of damage.
Let us organize the analysis by the content of the argument, indicating the judgments in
which they appear.
2.1 REPARATION IS UNNECESSARY
The first reason given for denying reparation for non-pecuniary damages for child neglect
is that it is unnecessary, since all the purposes that could justify non-pecuniary damages would
already be fulfilled by other legal means (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 9). These functions would be:
punishment, deterrence, and reparation (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 7-9).
Regarding punishment and deterrence, says Justice Fernando Gonçalves (BRAZIL, 2005,
p. 7-8, emphasis in original, our translation):
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12 However, this solution raises many problems. According to Püschel and Aquino (2019, p. 198, our trans-
lation), “the arguments brought by the 3rd Panel to admit civil liability for child neglect in certain cir-
cumstances do not establish an exception to the rule defended by the 4th Panel, but refer to a different
rule. To consider the decision of the 3rd Panel as an exception to the rule previously established by the
4th Panel would be to admit a logical contradiction”. In addition, by failing to judge the merits of the Embar-
gos de Divergência, the Second Chamber of the STJ failed to establish the requirements for recognition of
the proclaimed exception (PÜSCHEL; AQUINO, 2019, p. 201).
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In case of abandonment or unjustified non-compliance with the duty of child support,
custody and education of children [...] the legislation provides as punishment the
loss of parental authority [...] both in the Statute of the Child and Adolescent, art. 24,
as in the Civil Code, art. 1638, item II. Thus, the legal system, with the determination
of the loss of parental authority, the most serious civil penalty to be imposed on a father,
already takes care of the punitive function and acts as a deterrent, showing effectively to
individuals that the Law and society do not sympathize with the conduct of abandonment,
with which the most poignant justification of those who defend indemnity for child neglect
falls to the ground.
Regarding the objective of material reparation, this would not justify liability, since such
purpose is fulfilled by the payment of child support (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 9).
With this argument, there is a complete reversal of the sanction of loss of parental author-
ity, which is fundamentally a means of protecting the minor and not a punishment for the
wrongful father (DIAS, 2011, p. 434; LOBO, 2018, p. 309).
How could the loss of parental authority be considered a punishment for non-compliance
with parental duties, if such a sanction establishes precisely the loss of such duties? We would
have a conduct punished with its equivalent: the removal of the father would be punished with
the removal of the father, which makes no sense, even logically.13
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that the confirmation as legitimate of what a subject
already wanted (withdrawal from the child) can have a deterrent effect. Deterrence depends
on whether people fear the imposition of the sanction and therefore cease to commit the
unlawful act (PÜSCHEL, 2011, p. 169). Of course, it is not possible to believe that a father
who intends to abandon his son is afraid of the sanction of loss of parental authority. This is
“the most serious civil penalty to be imputed to a father” (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 8, our trans-
lation) only when the father does not want to give up his duties towards his son.
Finally, in regards to the material reparation, child support is not reparative. It derives
from parenthood and not from the practice of an unlawful act (DIAS, 2011, p. 513).
In this case the argument can be considered sexist in that, by refusing legal sanction to the
offending father, it protects men who leave their offspring, reinforcing the difference of power
between men and women already observed in society, by overloading the woman-mother with
the care of the children. In addition, it minimizes the importance of caring for the offspring,
devaluing a socially considered female activity.
9:A FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF CHILD NEGLECT CASES FROM THE BRAZILIAN SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
13 As Justice Sidnei Beneti correctly points out (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 34-35).
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2.2 EXCLUSIVE APPLICATION OF FAMILY LAW
Related to the previous argument, there is the notion that the rules of tort liability do not
apply to family relations, defended by Justice Aldir Passarinho Junior and Justice Cesar Asfor
Rocha. The latter justifies it, stating that “Family Law has its own principles that cannot be
influenced by other principles that are exclusively related or – at least – more strongly related
to other branches of law” (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 14, our translation).
An attenuated version of this same argument is defended by Justice Paulo de Tarso San-
severino, in an opinion in which he defends non-pecuniary damages in family matters, but
only in very exceptional and extreme cases of “effective excess in family relations” (BRAZIL,
2012, p. 41, our translation). The rationale for this would be that:
Due to the very delicate nature of family relationships, tort liability in Family Law cannot
be equated with tort liability in general, otherwise it would require a degree of caution
in daily family life that is incompatible with family relationships, besides it would lead to
an undesirable patrimonialization of personal relationships, precisely in their most intimate
aspect. (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 41, our translation)
However, the family can be a protective environment for some and of suffering for oth-
ers. To exclude family relationships from sanctions for the practice of unlawful acts is thus
to preserve the differences of power existing in family relations, harming their most vulner-
able members.
The data on domestic violence shows the hierarchy in family relations and leaves no
doubt that the exclusion of sanctions for unlawful acts within the family has different effects
according to gender, harming especially women. The 2015 Map of Violence: Homicide of Women
(Mapa da violência 2015: Homicídio de mulheres no Brasil), for example, indicates that women
are more likely to experience violence in their own homes, while men suffer more violence
on the street, and assaults on women are more often committed by people known to the vic-
tim, while men are more often attacked by strangers (WAISELFISZ, 2015, p. 74).14
Home and family are not an environment of equality between men and women, so exclud-
ing civil liability sanctions from family relations has the effect of disadvantaging women and
contributing to the perpetuation of inequality.
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14 In the same vein, the 2011 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) global study conclud-
ed that this is a well-documented situation and is not restricted to Brazil (UNODC, 2011, p. 58).
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2.3 THE REPARATION MEETSTHE INTERESTS OFTHE FORMER PARTNER
According to this argument, attributing liability to the parent who has abandoned his child could
serve as a way of satisfying the interests of the other parent, both personal and economic.
According to Justice Fernando Gonçalves:
It should be borne in mind that often the one with sole child custody transfers to the child
feelings of hatred and revenge nurtured against their former partner, not to mention that
compensation may not exactly ease the suffering of the minor, but also satisfy the financial
ambition of the person rejected in the romantic relationship. (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 8,
our translation)
Despite the seemingly neutral language, it is possible to see the effect of gender stereo-
types on this argument. The justice refers to the fact that it is common for the parent “with sole
child custody” to transfer feelings of hatred and revenge against the former partner and seek
to satisfy their own financial ambitions at the expense of their former partner.
The justice does not consider the possibility that feelings of hatred and revenge, as well
as financial ambitions, may be reciprocal, or held by the parent who abandons the child.
Considering that, as stated above, it is usually the fathers who abandon and the mothers
who keep custody, it is clear that the justice refers to women-mothers as transfering feelings
of hatred and revenge to their children, in addition to having the disreputable purpose of
enriching themselves at the expense of the man-father.
Given the familiar subterfuges employed by many men-fathers to lower child support or
exclude the unwanted child from inheritance,15 it seems reasonable to suppose that feelings
of hatred and revenge, as well as greed, tend to be at least, as frequent among the parents who
abandon their children, as among those who are left with sole custody of the child. So the
argument makes an arbitrary distinction between the parents who abandon their children and
those who stay with their children, leaving the latter disadvantaged – those who as already
said – are mostly women-mothers.
As for the supposed goal of getting rich at the expense of ex-partners, as we men-
tioned above, poverty data in households where a woman and children under 14 live indicate
that divorce tends to have a disproportionately negative financial impact on women-mothers
compared to men-fathers. This situation is reinforced by the argument under consideration,
formulated without reference to any specific aspect of the cases on trial or consideration of
the population data, thus based solely on the judges’ prejudices.
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15 The case tried by the 3rd Panel in 2012 is precisely an example of this kind of situation. The ruling states
that the father acquired real estate by fraud, in an attempt to deprive the unwanted daughter of her inheri-
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2.4 THE POSSIBILITYTO RECONSTRUCTTHE RELATIONSHIP MUST BE PRESERVED
According to this argument, holding the father liable for child neglect should be avoided,
since it would compromise the possibility of reconciliation between father and child. In the
words of Justice Fernando Gonçalves:
Perhaps by admitting indemnity for child neglect we are definitively burying the possibility
of a father, either now or in old age, seeking protection in the love of his children [...]
Certainly a dispute between the parties would drastically reduce hope of the child being
welcomed, albeit belatedly, by paternal love. (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 9, our translation)
The protection of the family and the conciliatory objective linked to this idea are argu-
ments found in other situations of discrimination against women.16Again, it must be borne
in mind that the preservation of the family in this context means the preservation of the gen-
der hierarchy in family relations. Interestingly in the case of Justice Fernando Gonçalves the
protection seems to be directly aimed at the interest of the father, who may want to seek
the protection of his child.
A variant of this argument appears in the opinion of Justice Massami Uyeda, for whom the
recognition of liability for child neglect by the court would bring an end to peace, establishing
a “strife within the family” (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 16).
2.5 IMPOSSIBILITY OF FORCING SOMEONETO LOVE
According to the argument defended by Justice Fernando Gonçalves, there can be no lia-
bility for child neglect because the law cannot compel someone to love (BRAZIL, 2005,
p. 10).
By qualifying the issue in terms of the lack of a legal duty to love, this argument reduces the
duties of paternity to the material needs of the child, contrary to the express legal provision
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tance rights (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 37-38). This matter was tried by the Court of Appeal of the State of São Paulo
(TJSP) (BRAZIL, 2009b), which confirmed the first-instance sentence of nullity of the fraudulent contract
celebrated to the detriment of the unwanted daughter.
16 As an example we can mention the practice identified in the treatment of violence against women cases
in the Special Criminal Courts (Jecrim), where “The judge’s perception of what the family is and the impor-
tance of its social role” was what guided decisions, with the “expected performance of roles by men and
women in the family script” replacing “women as subjects of rights”, a situation that is much criticized by
feminist movements (DEBERT; BERALDO DE OLIVEIRA, 2007, p. 331-332, our translation). According
to Marcella Beraldo de Oliveira, at Jecrim the focus was “on achieving quick conciliation, preserving the
family and its hierarchies, reifying the relationship of violence” (2008, p. 46). 
REVISTA DIREITO GV  |  SÃO PAULO  |  V. 16 N. 1  |  e1944 |  2020ESCOLA DE DIREITO DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS
(art. 1,634, I, of the Civil Code [CC]) and to the dominant doctrinal understanding (DIAS,
2011, p. 425; LOBO, 2018, p. 313).17
An argument that is related to the idea of impossibility of forcing someone to love is the
rejection of transforming affection into money, which is found in the opinion of Justice Cesar
Asfor Rocha (BRAZIL, 2005, p. 14).
It should be noted, however, that such an objection could be made toward liability for non-
pecuniary damages generally, since it results from injury to personal rights and – by definition
– has no monetary value.18 This general issue of non-pecuniary damages was resolved by the
constitutional provision (art. 5, V and X, FC) and legal provision (art. 186, CC) that expressly
recognize the reparability of non-pecuniary damages, so that the justice should have substan-
tiated the differential treatment that he gave in this case. Without such substantiation, we are left
with an unjustified differentiation, which in practice favors men.
2.6 CHILD NEGLECT AS A FACT OF LIFE
There is also the argument presented by Justice Massami Uyeda, in the sense that child neglect
and its consequences are facts of life (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 16) and, as such, not indemnifiable.
According to the justice, any child may feel deprived compared to their siblings, a situa-
tion that could also occur between spouses and in family relationships in general, since no one
is perfect (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 16). Life, says the justice, “is made up of losses and gains, per-
haps even more losses than gains” and – with the expressiveness of oral manifestations – he
concludes: “If we open this thesis here, as people would say, run for the hills. This Court will
take care of heartbreak” (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 25, our translation).
Here we have the explicit devaluation of the damages suffered in family relationships.
Given the power asymmetry within the family, this amounts to privileging its strongest mem-
bers over the most vulnerable. The privileged position of the man-father in relation not only
to their daughters and sons, but also to the woman-mother is reinforced.
A mitigated version of this argument is defended by Justice Paulo de Tarso Sanseverino,
who is in favor of reparation for child neglect only in exceptional situations. According to the
justice, frustrations that occur in the family contribute to the growth of the individual,19 and
are in part inherent to life and inevitable (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 41).
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17 The solution to this question given by the 3rd Panel, with the recognition of a duty of care, on the contrary,
is compatible with a broader understanding of parental duties, enabling the inclusion of the duty to direct
the upbringing and education of children, provided for in art. 1634, I, of the CC (BRAZIL, 2012).
18 In fact, this is an objection that has already been made regarding the reparability of non-pecuniary damages
in general (MELO DA SILVA, 1983, p. 360-367).
19 Although adversity is an opportunity for the growth of the individual, it seems to us that overcoming it should be
considered the merit of the person who faced it, not a justification for the conduct of the person who caused it.
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2.7 MATERNAL CO-RESPONSIBILITY
Finally, we have the argument that the value of reparation should be reduced in proportion
to the father’s contribution to the neglect of the child. The assumption is that the mother is
co-responsible for the neglect practiced by the father, when adopting aggressive conduct
towards him. The possibility of the father reacting to his partner’s aggression other than
by abandonment (for example, by asking for custody of the child) or the aggression of the
mother being provoked by the faulty father himself is not considered.20
The argument of maternal co-responsibility is especially interesting for our analysis for
two reasons. Firstly, because it was defended by Justices Sidnei Beneti and Paulo de Tarso
Sanseverino in opinions in favor of reparation for the damages resulting from child neglect,
even if only in exceptional cases (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 36-37; 44). This shows that the male bias
is even in the constitution of the winning thesis itself in the STJ.
Secondly, because the argument contradicts express statutory rule. Even if one under-
stands that the mother contributed to the practice of unlawful behavior by acting aggressively
towards the father, thus preventing or hindering his access to and regular contact with the
child, and that she should therefore be considered co-responsible for the harm deriving from
paternal abandonment, it would be a case of joint liability, by virtue of art. 942 of the CC.
This means that the victim of the wrongdoing can choose against whom to bring the action
of liability in tort and that any of the co-responsible wrongdoers may be compelled to pay the
entire amount of damages (CC, art. 275). The person who pays the total damages can later com-
pel the other co-responsible wrongdoer to reimburse their own share of the debt (CC, art. 283).
According to the express statutory text, the father should therefore be ordered to pay the
full amount of the reparation, and – if he wished – charge the mother of his child the portion
of this payment that corresponds to her participation in the wrongdoing.
Despite this, Justice Sidnei Beneti concludes that “the amount set is excessive, because the
proportionality of the action and omission of the father, now Appellant, in causing the moral
distress to the daughter, now Appealed, was not taken into account” (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 37,
our translation). The rule of joint liability was not even considered in this case.
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20 In an opinion in which he reduces the amount of damages based on the mother’s co-responsibility, Justice
Sidnei Beneti does so “in spite of human sympathy for the situation of the mother, who, according to the
file, had a premarital relationship with the defendant, now Appellant, for eight years, who left her preg-
nant shortly before the birth of the plaintiff daughter, who only had her paternity recognized by court
decision after long-term resistance from the father in a long legal process” (BRAZIL, 2012 , p. 37, our trans-
lation). It should also be noted that, by reducing the value of the conviction to half the amount granted
by the previous instance, Justice Sidnei Beneti considers that the mother contributed to the abandonment
to the same extent as the father (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 38).
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Not only is the woman-mother burdened with raising her child without a paternal
presence, but also the civil liability for the negative consequences of parental neglect. As the
data on poverty in Brazil indicate, being a single mother alone is a considerable social disad-
vantage. The idea of  maternal co-responsibility for neglect reinforces the power asymmetry
between the father-men and the mother-women, not only in the dimension of material liv-
ing conditions, but also in the symbolic dimension. Given that the cultural aspect of gender
stratification is one of the most persistent, the question of maternal co-responsibility is a mat-
ter of great relevance for the achievement of equality between men and women.
3 THE EXISTENCE OF ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS
The male bias of the above arguments becomes more evident to the extent that reasonable
legal arguments can be developed that do not imply the use of gender stereotypes, nor the
devaluation of interests or fields of human experience considered feminine, or comparatively
greater detrimental effects to women.
In the case of the STJ’s rulings on child neglect, such alternative positions were, in fact,
defended in both Panels and since the first decision on the subject.
In the 4th Panel in 2005, Justice Barros Monteiro, in his dissenting opinion, stated that
the sanction of loss of parental authority does not exclude the parent’s liability for non-pecu-
niary damages (BRAZIL, 2005, p.13).
In the 3rd Panel, there is the opinion of Justice Nancy Andrighi, who expressly refutes
the argument of the uniqueness of Family Law, stating that there are no legal restrictions
on the application of liability rules to family relations. On the contrary, according to the jus-
tice, the statutory texts dealing with civil liability do so “broadly and unrestrictedly, from
which it can be inferred that they regulate even relationships born within a family nucleus in
their various forms” (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 5-6).
The justice also expressly responds to the argument that the sanction of loss of parental
authority would be sufficient in such cases, stating that the imposition of such a sanction can-
not exclude reparation, “because its primary objective is to safeguard the integrity of the
minor by offering through other means, the upbringing and education denied by the parents,
and never to compensate for the damage that comes from the poor care the child received”
(BRAZIL, 2012, p. 6).
Justice Nancy Andrighi – as well as Justice Barros Monteiro before her (BRAZIL, 2005,
p. 13) – structures her argument from the general elements of civil liability: unlawfulness,
fault, harm, and causation (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 6-14).
The most controversial aspect of liabilitty for child neglect is unlawfulness, that is, the
violation of a legal duty. In this regard, Justice Nancy Andrighi points out that the relation-
ship between parents and children is not only emotional, but also legal and that:
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Among the duties inherent to parental authority, stand out the duty of coexistence,
care, raising and education of the children, aspects that obviously involve the necessary
transmission of attention and the accompaniment of the child’s social-psychological
development. (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 7, our translation)
So, continues the justice,
the debate acquires more technical contours, since the measurement of the intangible
– love – is no longer discussed, but rather the verification of compliance, non-
-compliance, or partial fulfillment of a legal obligation: care. (BRAZIL, 2012,
p. 10, emphasis in original)
The justice responds to the argument that it is impossible to force love by identifying the
element of unlawfulness in the breach of the legal duty of care, concluding in this respect that
“loving is a faculty, caring is a duty” (BRAZIL, 2012, p. 11, our translation).
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the debate on civil liability for child neglect in the STJ allows us to conclude
that both in the 3rd as well as the 4th Panel and throughout the period in which the debate
developed – from the first case to the Embargos de Divergência judgment on the issue – sexist
arguments were involved.
Male biases are present in both unfavorable and favorable opinions for reparation. The male
biases are shown by the disregard of the doctrinal tradition and the specialized literature, as
well as by the disregard of the ambivalent character of family relations and their hierarchical
structures. This bias is shown, furthermore, through the express devaluation of female inter-
ests and life experiences, via the use of negative female stereotypes, and through problems
in argumentative logic and systematic interpretation of the law, and even disregard of an
express statutory norm. It is clear that the STJ was not able to take into account the female
point of view and the concrete circumstances in which child neglect happens today in Brazil,
nor its consequences for women-mothers in single-parent families.
The result is that the STJ developed the concept of indemnifiable harm in a sense that,
while apparently gender neutral, is in reality founded on discriminatory rationale and has
disproportionately more severe effects on women.
Obviously, we do not mean that liability for child neglect is the solution to the problem
of the burden that domestic and care work has on women-mothers in single-parent families.
It seems to us that civil liability should not be a central element of a gender equality policy,
due to the institution’s own limitations.
Tort liability depends on expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain success in court
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proceedings. In addition, for the reparation to actually take place, the father must be able
to afford it.
Given the fact that abandonment leads to poverty for most of these families, especially
those headed by black women, it is clear that this is an alternative available only to a minor-
ity of daughters, sons, and mothers.
The emancipation of women-mothers who raise their children in situations of paternal
abandonment depends on advances in other fields, especially public policies to support
female work, social security, and the care of children, the elderly, and the sick (ITABORAÍ,
2017, p. 342).
Still, it cannot be admitted that the development of tort liability by courts – or of any
other legal institution – follows in the opposite direction from the pursuit of gender equal-
ity. The STJ’s decisions, based on sexist arguments, reinforce the existing gender hierarchy
and undermine the achievement of the constitutional objective of gender equality.
Therefore, our analysis recommends a broader investigation into the male biases embedded
in the legal institutions of private law, with the aim of presenting the problem explicitly for
democratic reflection.
The gender biases implicit in court rulings also raise the fundamental question of the per-
meability of courts to female voices; and thus the question of the relationship between legal
doctrine and the institutional structure of the courts themselves and of the entire justice sys-
tem from law schools through the structure of the judicial and administrative procedures to
the structure of access, promotion, etc. of judges.
The fact that within the STJ itself there were dissonant opinions, on the other hand, allows
us to conclude this article optimistically as to the potential for legal doctrine to play a role
in promoting equality, rather than merely reinforcing the hierarchy between the sexes, which
is still very present in Brazilian society.
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